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Recently, police departments, legislators, media, and the public at large in the U.S. have increas-
ingly been concerned about racial disparities in o±cers' issuing tra±c tickets. Ascertaining the
extent to which an observed disparity re°ects racial bias is the crucial issue. First, we use a the-
oretical model which borrows features from the recent literature regarding racial bias in vehicle
searches. In our model, motorists, picking the speed to travel at, take into account the probability
of getting ticketed and the speed that the o±cer will cite, while o±cers maximize a bene¯t function
generically increasing in the speed of ticketed drivers; this bene¯t function, however, is general
enough to allow o±cers to give certain drivers a break by citing them at a lower speed than they
were traveling. Empirically, we exploit the existence of a massive accumulation of speeding tickets
at 10 m.p.h. over the speed limit to elicit o±cers' discretionary behavior and leniency. Surprisingly,
about 30% of all ticketed drivers were cited for driving exactly at this particular speed. Using our
novel measure of o±cers' leniency, we ¯nd that especially white and male o±cers are heavily en-
gaged in discretionary behavior. We also ¯nd o±cers' discretion is racially biased; minority o±cers
are less lenient to minority drivers. This is interesting in comparison with Antonovics and Knight
(forthcoming) who, using the same data set, found evidence on own-race preferences in vehicle
searches.
JEL classi¯cation numbers: J70, K42
Keywords: Discretionary behavior, strict behavior, leniency, racial bias, drivers' speeding decision,
o±cers' ticketing and citation decision.
1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the national debate over racial pro¯ling has mostly focused on countless
accounts of unjusti¯ed searches, videotaped beatings, and so on. The national attention as well
as numerous lawsuits brought about against police departments nationwide - alleging racially prej-
udiced and at times harsh law enforcement practices - have grown like an avalanche since. The
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1resulting public outcry has later been recognized by politicians at the highest levels as well.1
In July 2003, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Bill Dedman and his co-author, Francie Latour,
reported the initial results of an analysis of 166,000 tickets and warnings from every police de-
partment in Massachusetts over a two-month period, April and May of 2001. Comparing speeding
tickets and warnings, they drew serious conclusions such as minorities, men and young drivers were
least likely to receive a warning, and thus less likely to get away with speeding. In this paper,
using the same data set, we will take a closer look at these issues focusing on racial bias in issuing
speeding tickets.
It is small wonder that Dedman and Latour's articles have attracted so much attention in
the short period of time since their initial appearance in the Boston Globe. First, the economic
impact of a tra±c ticket is considerable. Speeding tickets in Massachusetts start at $75 including
$25 surcharge for the Head Injury Trust Fund; for the ¯rst ten miles above the speed limit, the
¯ne is $75, and then it rises by ten dollars for each additional mile. But that typically is the
least of the problems. The Boston Globe estimates that a typical Massachusetts driver will pay
$350 in higher insurance premiums for a single ticket and $1400 for two tickets, over the six
years a ticket stays on the driving record. Second, while its monetary costs are explicit and
recognizable by everyone, disparate treatment of di®erent races, ethnicities and genders has other
serious implications: Individuals subjected to disparate tra±c enforcement may in time experience
a loss of respect and trust in their local police force.
Our main contribution in this paper is that we investigate police discretion especially regarding
reported speeds on issued citations. Police discretion goes beyond deciding whether to ticket a
speeding driver or just let drivers go with or without oral warnings. It also includes cases where
the o±cers give them a \break" - and a smaller ¯ne - by citing them at a lower speed than they
were traveling. One of this paper's most important contributions will be identifying a measure
of police discretion in terms of o±cers' underreporting especially at a particular lower speed very
often. Indeed Figure 1, the histogram of reported speeds in our sample, shows that reported speeds
are likely to be di®erent from drivers' actual speeds.2 There are outstanding spikes in some speci¯c
levels of speed, such as 10 and 15 m.p.h. over the speed limit. We will exploit this unique empirical
1On June 1999, President Clinton condemned racial pro¯ling as \morally indefensible," and described it as \the
opposite of good police work where actions are based on hard facts, not stereotypes." Finally, on June 18, 2003, the
Bush administration ordered a broad ban on racial and ethnic pro¯ling at all 70 federal law enforcement agencies.
2We will discuss Figure 1 in more detail in Section 5. In the process of providing us with the data, Bill Dedman
was quick to notice and point out this curious nature of the citation distribution as well - in particular the huge heap
of citations exactly at the speed of 10 m.p.h. over the limit.
2feature to elicit o±cers' discretionary behavior and leniency.3
Discretion - at least for our purposes - is broadly de¯ned as \latitude of choice within certain
bounds imposed by law" (Merriam-Webster, 1996). A discretionary behavior by an o±cer may
prevent him from reporting the actual speed of the driver for various plausible concerns. Strict
behavior, in contrast, implies that the o±cer tickets all speeding drivers at the exact speed they
drive. As one can easily predict, various factors such as drivers' age and ¯nancial situation - as
much as the latter can be judged by o±cers - as well as the current high levels of the ¯nes may play
signi¯cant roles in o±cers' discretion. In this paper, while we look at the above issues, we examine
particularly whether o±cers' discretionary behavior re°ects their racial bias.
Our simple theoretical model borrows features from the recent literature regarding racial bias
in police stops and searches (such as Knowles, Persico and Todd, 2001, and Antonovics and Knight,
forthcoming; AK hereafter); in addition, our model incorporates several stylized facts pertaining
to the institutional details in Massachusetts and to o±cers' and drivers' incentives. In our model,
motorists, picking the speed to travel at, take into account the probability of getting ticketed as
well as the speed that the o±cer will cite in deciding at what speed they will travel, while o±cers
- net of the cost of ticketing motorists - maximize a bene¯t function generically increasing in the
speed of ticketed drivers; this bene¯t function is then generalized to allow o±cers to give some
drivers a break by citing them at a lower speed than they were traveling.4 We then obtain results
on discretionary behavior and di®erential bias among di®erent races within di®erent subgroups of
the police.
Empirically, we examine the citation-o±cer matched data from the Boston Police Department
between April 2001 and November 2002. As illustrated by the above histogram, we ¯nd that
o±cers exhibit signi¯cant degrees of discretionary behavior. We verify that this discretionary
behavior indeed indicates a major form of leniency by o±cers { underreporting. We ¯nd that white
o±cers are the most lenient ones overall, followed by Hispanic and African-American o±cers, in
terms of speed-discounting leniency. Female o±cers are relatively stricter than male o±cers. We
3The following anecdote seems to support our empirical strategy. \There are always mitigating circumstances
in a stop," O±cer Knecht said in an interview with the Boston Globe. \Anything could be said or could happen.
Attitudes, people talking back to you. The circumstances change with each individual driver. But for most cops I
know, race has nothing to do with it." He recalled that he did indeed show leniency to at least one African-American
motorist on that day. \Although he wrote the man a ticket for only 10 m.p.h. over the 35 m.p.h. limit, he made a
note in the top right-hand corner of the ticket: `64'." That meant that the driver was actually going 64 m.p.h., or 29
m.p.h. over the limit. Admittedly, Knecht would sometimes lower the speed on a ticket, to save a driver a high ¯ne,
and the notation was there in case the driver challenged the ticket in court.
4Another distinct source of discretionary behavior which is quite innocuous is to set cuto® speed levels in stopping
drivers.
3do not ¯nd evidence of systematic racial bias in the form of `mutual or reciprocal' (e.g., white
o±cers discriminating against Hispanic motorists, and in turn, Hispanic o±cers discriminating
against white drivers) or `monolithic' (e.g., all o±cers discriminating against African-American
o±cers) racial bias. However, we ¯nd strong evidence that minority o±cers are less lenient to
minority drivers. Interestingly, there is no such minority-on-minority bias in the case of female
drivers or new-vehicle drivers. Our results, to a large extent, echo Dedman and Latour's ¯ndings
about o±cers' discretionary behavior in issuing warnings.5 There are also di®erences in how o±cers
treat in-town vs. out-of-town motorists, and commercial vs. non-commercial motorists. Finally,
we ¯nd that the degrees and forms of racial bias depend on its surroundings; there are signi¯cant
variations in terms of time of the day as well as di®erent neighborhoods. This conclusion calls for
more empirical studies on racial bias across di®erent contexts.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section summarizes the Related Literature. We then
present the Theoretical Setup, which is followed by a section on the Empirical Predictions of the
Theoretical Setup. Sections 5 and 6 are on Data and Empirical Strategy, respectively. In Section
7, we present our Empirical Findings, and ¯nally Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to two interrelated strands of recent research. The ¯rst strand concerns o±cers'
decision-making regarding whether they issue tickets or warnings to a driver with certain charac-
teristics. The main question is whether the decision-making is a®ected by the racial preferences
of o±cers. The results are mixed. The state-sponsored Northeastern Study, conducted by crimi-
nologists Farrell and McDevitt (2004), used the same Massachusetts data set as that of Dedman
and Latour.6 Their general results reveal major disparities in ticketing behavior of o±cers as man-
ifested by the distribution of tickets and warnings o±cers issued at di®erent speeds to motorists of
di®erent races.7
5We also report results regarding warnings.
6The Northeastern study employs the standard benchmark test which has been traditionally used in the early
literature studying racial bias in police stops and searches as well. This test compares the shares of racial minorities
in the population to their shares in the sample of drivers ticketed (or stopped and searched by the police in the
police search literature). In the use of this test, it is not clear what would be the right benchmark to compare the
tra±c citations. Ideally, it should be the racial composition of drivers on the road, but such information is typically
unavailable.
7This naturally raises a red °ag regarding the o±cers' intentions given that an early study by Lamberth (1996),
who examined driving habits of African-American and white motorists on Maryland highways, found no di®erence
in the rate at which these two segments of motorists engaged in speeding.
4McConnell and Scheidegger (2001) compared tickets issued by air-patrol o±cers with citations
issued by ground-patrol o±cers in order to overcome the traditional benchmark test's limitation.
This is indeed a \blind" vs. \not-blind" comparison since the race of the driver is hard to be
determined by the air-patrol o±cer. They found, surprisingly, that a smaller proportion of African-
Americans received ground-patrol citations than air-patrol citations. Ridgeway (2006) studied the
7,607 stops recorded by the Oakland Police Department in 2003. Using the propensity-score
matching method, he found that \black drivers are signi¯cantly less likely to be cited than non-
black drivers, black drivers are slightly less likely to be cited than white drivers, and white and
non-white drivers are not cited at signi¯cantly di®erent rates" (p. 19).
Some studies also looked at other types of discretionary behavior. The above-mentioned North-
eastern Study examined gender preferences of o±cers. Similarly, Blalock, DeVaro, Leventhal, and
Simon (2007) compared the data from Bloomington and Highland Park in Illinois, Wichita, Boston,
and the entire state of Tennessee and found out that female drivers are more likely to receive cita-
tions in three of the ¯ve locations, while male drivers are more likely to receive citations in the other
two locations. Makowsky and Stratmann (forthcoming) took a di®erent perspective and examined
the political-economy determinants of speeding tickets and tra±c ¯nes. Using the ¯rst-two-month
Massachusetts data excluding Boston, they found evidence that when local police o±cers issue
tickets, they pursue additional objectives as well - apart from strict law enforcement -, such as
maximizing their own utility and raising local government revenues from out-of-towners. Their
paper is in the same spirit with and complementary to our paper in that both papers focus on
police o±cers' discretionary behavior in issuing speeding tickets.
The second strand that our paper is related to is the quickly-growing literature on racial pro-
¯ling in tra±c stops and searches. Economists have recently joined the debate which was initially
dominated by criminologists and statisticians employing the benchmark test. The interest of crim-
inologists and statisticians in the subject started shortly after the 1993 civil case involving an
African-American attorney, Robert L. Wilkins, as the plainti®, who alleged that the Maryland
State Police stopped and searched him simply because of his ethnicity. As a result of a consent
decree, a researcher, John Lamberth, conducted extensive research as a part of criminal prosecution
on Maryland highways; he later conducted similar research on New Jersey Turnpike. In both cases,
he found major racial disparities in tra±c stops and searches; his latter results were reported in
State of New Jersey vs. Soto (1996). Later, Harris (1999) conducted interviews with motorists who
were stopped, examined o±cial records collected by several large departments in Ohio, and found
5similar results. More recently, Novak (2004) reported that, although disproportionate number of
minorities is stopped and searched by the Kansas police, they are more likely to be stopped at
night and to reside outside the city.
Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), on the other hand, had a di®erent conclusion by examining
the di®erences in stops when police are unable to observe the drivers' race at night versus in the
presence of daylight. Using the data from Oakland, California, they ¯nd that African-American
drivers are more likely to be stopped when it is dark outside and o±cers cannot easily observe the
motorist's race. Consequently, they are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no racial pro¯ling.
A number of recent papers in economics have attempted to determine whether the observed
racial disparities in policing patterns can be explained better by models of statistical discrimination
or by models of preference-based discrimination. In Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), police decide
which vehicles to search and motorists decide whether to carry contraband such as drugs or illegal
weapons. O±cers who are not racially biased maximize the number of successful searches, de¯ned
as uncovering contraband, net of conducting the cost of a search.8 Racial bias is incorporated in
the model as a reduction in the perceived cost of searching vehicles of certain types of motorists.
Biased monitoring implies that the equilibrium rate at which contraband is seized (the \hit rate")
is lower for the groups subject to bias. Using vehicle search data from Maryland, they found that
the hit rates are indeed equalized across races.
Three other particularly relevant papers in that literature are Dharmapala and Ross (2004),
Anwar and Fang (2006), and AK (forthcoming). Although they have their modeling di®erences,
the ¯rst two papers assume that it is infeasible for the police to deter crime in a given subgroup
of the population perfectly; given this assumption, they in turn show that the hit rate test is not
necessarily valid. In addition, Anwar and Fang (2006) provide a test for \di®erential bias" within
di®erent subgroups of the police. Using the Florida State Highway Patrol data, they cannot reject
the hypothesis of no di®erential bias. AK (forthcoming), whose analysis is similar in spirit to that
of Anwar and Fang (2006), use the same Boston data we use in this paper; they ¯nd that o±cers
are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the o±cer di®ers from the race of the driver. It
is interesting to note that the same data show di®erent types of racial bias; they ¯nd own-race
preferences or racial bias against di®erent races, while we ¯nd minority-on-minority racial bias.
8For in-depth discussion regarding the objective of police vehicle search, refer to Dominitz and Knowles (2006)
and Close and Mason (2007). In addition, Close and Mason (2007), using the same data from the Florida State
Highway Patrol used by Anwar and Fang (2006), compared consent versus non-consent searches and examined search
rationale given by o±cers.
6Our paper is in line with the latter two papers in that we focus on di®erential bias.
3 Theoretical Setup
3.1 Equilibrium without Underreporting and Racial Preferences
Suppose an o±cer is in charge of a particular segment of a route at a certain time of the day. We
¯rst consider the case of o±cers who neither have any racial preference nor engage in underreporting
- the latter implies that, when these o±cers choose to ticket a speeding driver,9 they report the
actual speed of a driver.
Let c denote all characteristics of a motorist other than race that may a®ect the decision of the
police o±cer as to whether to issue a tra±c citation (interchangeably, ticket) or not. The variable
c may be unobserved or only partially observed by third parties (including the econometrician). As
in the racial bias literature, here too the variable c will be treated as a one-dimensional variable.
Likewise, let C denote all characteristics of an o±cer other than race that may a®ect his decision as
to whether to issue a tra±c citation or not. The variable C too may be unobserved or only partially
observed by third parties (including the econometrician) and will be treated as a one-dimensional
variable. Experience and gender are among notable o±cer characteristics.
O±cers compare the marginal cost and marginal bene¯t of issuing a ticket to a motorist who
is traveling at speed S. Let b(S;cjC) > 0 denote the bene¯t function of an o±cer of type (C) from
citing a driver of type (c) at their actual speed10 S > S, where S > 0 is the speed limit on the
portion of the road at which the driver was stopped.
Let ~ S(c) > 0 denote the maximum speed a driver of type (c) may technically and safely ¯nd
desirable in the absence of any ¯nes. Let ~ s(c) ´ ~ S(c) ¡ S (and s ´ S ¡ S). Observe that this
re-scaling will allow us to measure every relevant speed level relative to the speed limit. To avoid
trivial cases, we will assume that ~ s(c) for type (c) is high enough to accommodate real-life speeds
(such as the ones, as data indicate, that can exceed the speed limit by more than 40-50 miles at
times).
9Issuing warnings and not stopping a speeding driver are all equivalent in the eyes of the driver in terms of avoiding
a hefty cost regardless of the particular action taken by o±cers.
10Although a driver may have an optimal speed in mind, it may be di±cult to maintain that speed consistently;
even when it is possible, a strict o±cer's radar gun as well may record it at a di®erent speed level due to the inherent
margin of error such electronic devices have. Thus, there is some degree of randomness involved regarding the speed
of a driver. We will, however, deliberately abstract away from this aspect in our theoretical model in order not to
complicate things further by incorporating motorists' risk preferences. As we will explain later, the randomness in
fact strengthens our empirical ¯ndings.
7Let ~ s ´ max ~ s(c) over all driver types (c). We normalize the o±cer's bene¯t of a tra±c ticket
issued at that speed, b(~ s;cjC), to equal one, so that the marginal cost of writing a ticket (or of
stopping a driver - which we will consider in the Appendix) is scaled as a fraction of a well-de¯ned
maximum possible bene¯t to a police o±cer. For an o±cer, the marginal cost of writing a ticket
to any motorist is denoted by t where 0 < t < 1. Given the o±cer's cost of issuing a ticket to a
driver and given the bene¯t function, we can de¯ne a strict o±cer: a strict o±cer of type (C) has
b(s;cjC) > t for any given s;c; and t; thus either b(s;cjC) is very high for any s > 0 or t is very
low or both. Whenever on duty, a strict o±cer will stop any speeding driver on the route he is in
charge of, and report the actual speed the motorist was traveling at.
The probability of a ticket a driver of type (c) will receive while traveling at speed s will be
denoted by °(s;cjC) (where 0 · °(s;cjC) · 1). Since any particular route may not be policed
all the time, °(s;cjC) may be zero sometimes during a given day, and very low on certain days if
police enforcement is absent for prolonged periods of time on speci¯c days. Let z > 0 denote this
probability that an o±cer will be present on a certain route at a given time. A motorist will take
this probability into consideration and will consider z ¢ °(s;cjC) as the ticketing probability she
faces.
Unlike the o±cers who encounter di®erent driver types, many times every day, a motorist may
hardly encounter di®erent o±cer types every day or even every month. Therefore, a motorist's
conjecture regarding the value of °(s;cjC) is ¯rst based on her observation of the frequency of
stopped cars by police o±cers on her usual route on di®erent days and times. Although the
motorist may not be able to distinguish between the cases whether an o±cer is writing a ticket or a
warning (or will be letting the stopped driver go with only an oral warning), such observations and
the information that she gathers from other sources are her most important sources in reaching a
conjecture on the value of °(s;cjC). Let f(C) be the distribution of C in the o±cer population on
that route. Let E° ´
R
°(s;cjC)f(C)dC denote the expectation of the driver of type (c) regarding
°(s;cjC).
The penalty function is denoted by p(sjc) > 0. In Massachusetts, as mentioned before, for
the ¯rst ten miles above the speed limit, the ¯ne is $75, and then it rises by ten dollars for each
additional mile. But the major hit typically comes with the car insurance bill. As the Boston
Globe has estimated, a Massachusetts driver will pay $350 in higher insurance premia for a single
ticket (and $1,400 altogether for two tickets - in that sense as well, the penalty function depends
8on c), over the six years it stays on the driving record. Thus, the penalty function takes the form:
p(sjc) = ® for 0 < s · 10
p(sjc) = ® + 10 ¢ (s ¡ 10) for 10 < s
(1)
where ® > 0 denotes the initial speeding ¯ne $75 plus the present discounted value of the $350
insurance premium because of the ¯rst speeding ticket (or $1,400 with a second ticket - and even
more with yet another one) the driver will incur over the next six years.
For a driver of type (c); the function v(s;c) will measure the variable bene¯t from speeding (such
as arriving at a particular destination earlier, the pure joy of driving at a particular high speed, and
so on), net of safety and gas mileage concerns. These variable bene¯ts will be wiped out if there is
a 100% ticketing probability that the driver faces at some speed; that is, this variable part of the
bene¯t function will a®ect a driver's utility more as the ticketing probability decreases. Thus, it
is reasonable to presume that a motorist's utility function has a non-negative ¯xed bene¯t portion
that the driver does not lose even after getting ticketed with 100% probability. Let D ¸ 0 denote
this ¯xed bene¯t in the motorist's utility function, una®ected by ticketing probability she faces.
Putting everything together, the utility function of driver of type (c), will have the canonical form
(a somewhat similar version of which is also used in the police stop-and-search literature):
u(s;c;z;°) = D + (1 ¡ z)v(s;c) + z(1 ¡ E°)v(s;c) ¡ zE°p(sjc)
, u(s;c;z;°) = D + (1 ¡ zE°) ¢ v(s;c) ¡ zE°p(sjc)
(2)
A driver will maintain a speed s¤ at which her expected utility is maximized. Any realistic variable
bene¯t function should comply with the fact that many drivers ¯nd it optimal to drive beyond the
speed limit as well as to speed more than ten miles above that limit. This implies the presence
of certain types of variable bene¯t functions.11 Further, given some parameter values, any such
function should generate an optimal natural maximum speed in the absence of any ¯nes (\natural"
due to safety and technical reasons, as mentioned above). For that to happen, the variable bene¯t
function should also exhibit a declining range of marginal bene¯t at very high speeds and eventually
reach a value of zero at s¤ = ~ s(c).
The simplest functional form that exhibits all of these properties is the quadratic form. Observe
that the variable bene¯t function below exhibits increasing bene¯t in some range of speeds exceeding
11In the Appendix, we show that some simple linear functional forms - such as v(s;c) = a0 and v(s;c) = a0 +a1 ¢s
- should not be considered due to that concern.
9the limit by 10 m.p.h. and declining bene¯t at some higher speeds (eventually reaching the peak
at s¤ = ~ s(c), at least for some coe±cient values). Let a0 ¸ 0 and a1;a2 > 0:
v(s;c) = a0 + a1 ¢ ~ s(c) ¢ s ¡ a2 ¢ s2 for s · ~ s(c) (3)
The marginal bene¯t of speeding with this functional form is positive ¯rst and becomes negative
for higher s. We will use the functional form above as the canonical form of a driver's variable
bene¯t function with type (c). First, observe that, in order for a driver to speed above the limit,
u(s;c;z;°) = D + (1 ¡ zE°)v(s;c) ¡ zE°p(sjc) > 0 must hold. That is, if u(s;c;z;°) < 0, the
driver will not speed. If u(s;c;z;°) = 0, the driver will be indi®erent between speeding and not
speeding.
Given Equations (1), (2) and (3), the optimizing behavior yields, for the driver of type (c), the









where p0 denote dp(sjc)=ds, which is 0 if s¤ < 10 and 10 if s¤ ¸ 10. Observe that s¤ decreases in
both E° and z. In addition, for ~ s(c) to be the maximum speed, a1 = 2a2 must hold. Note that
there is no restriction for the range of s¤ except s¤ · ~ s(c). Given the undi®erentiable structure of
the penalty function, one may erroneously expect s¤(c;z;°) to be either zero or greater than 10.
The following ¯gure, however, illustrates that 0 < s¤(c;z;°) · 10 is possible as well since s¤(c;z;°)
can reach a maximum in that range.
An o±cer makes two main types of decisions: the stopping decision and the ticketing decision.
The stopping decision (which is not fully observable to the econometrician) is rather complicated
- and to some extent non-crucial to our analysis; a full-°edged version of it (incorporating under-
reporting and racial preferences) will take place in the Appendix.
Suppose the o±cer chooses to stop a driver who is traveling at speed s; upon stopping the
driver, the o±cer can ¯nd out about (c). Then an o±cer of type (C) will obtain the following net
bene¯t from ticketing that driver
b(s;cjC) ¡ t (5)
Equation (5) implies the following. If b(s;cjC) ¡ t < 0, then the optimizing behavior implies
°(s;cjC) = 0; that is, the o±cer's best response is to never ticket motorist type (c); who speeds
10at s. If b(s;cjC) ¡ t > 0, then the o±cer will be willing to issue a ticket to type (c); that is, the
o±cer's best response is to always ticket motorist type c who speeds at s. If b(s;cjC)¡t = 0, then
the o±cer will be willing to randomize over whether to issue a ticket to type c, who speeds at s or
not ticketing the motorist at all.
Thus, for motorists of type (c), and o±cers of type (C), there is a unique equilibrium of this
discretionary interaction (i.e., game) in which (1) drivers' correct conjecture regarding the expected
ticketing probability of an o±cer, zE°, on a given route and the penalty function, p(sjc) > 0, renders
motorists of type (c) driving on that route to choose a particular best response speed level, and
(2) the behavior of motorists of type (c) and an o±cer type (C)'s maximum bene¯t associated
with each (s;cjC) render the o±cer indi®erent between ticketing them after stopping them at some
speed level (i.e., such an o±cer will surely be willing to ticket them beyond that speed level and
not willing to ticket them below).
Figure 3a graphs the canonical best response functions for motorists and o±cers when s¤ ¸ 10.
Then the step function represents the best response function of the o±cer on that route and
the downward-sloping curve represents the best response function of motorists type (c) given the
expectation about the o±cer's type. Recall that z denotes the probability that the o±cer will
be present on that certain route at any given time that the driver travels. Figure 3b depicts the
equilibrium in which the driver takes into consideration the expected value of the two di®erent types
of o±cers' ticketing best response functions (high cuto® speed, `high s¤', and low cuto® speed, `low
s¤'). Taking that expected value into consideration, the driver's equilibrium speed is such that she
would be ticketed by the stricter o±cer type while she would not be ticketed by the more lenient
o±cer type.
3.2 Equilibrium with Underreporting and Racial Preferences
Let r 2 fa;wg denote a driver's race, and let R 2 fA;Wg denote an o±cer's race which are
observable by both parties upon meeting each other in person. Let f(CjW) and f(CjA) be the
distribution of C in the white and African-American o±cer populations on that route, respectively.
Let g(R) > 0 be the probability that the o±cer on the route the driver is traveling is of race R.






g(R) denote the expectation
of the driver of type (c;r) regarding the di®erent ticketing probabilities,°(s;c;rjC;R), by di®erent
o±cer types (C;R).
Underreporting is such that the o±cer cites a driver of type (c;r) at speed ¾ < s; if ¾ = 0,
11observe that the motorist is not ticketed.12 Let bR
r (¾;s;cjC) 2 (0:1] denote the bene¯t function of
an o±cer of type (C;R) from citing an additional driver of type (c;r) at speed ¾, who was actually
traveling at speed s.
There may be some drivers with type (c, r) assessed more favorably by some o±cer of type (C,
R) - e.g., polite, old, quite, female - and some other characteristics assessed less favorably by him
- e.g., rude, young, talking-back, male; likewise, non-minorities may be assessed more favorably
than minorities. It is reasonable to think that such an o±cer will report a speed ¾¤ < s in the
former cases, and a speed ¾¤ = s in the latter cases. Nevertheless, we will assume that ¾ will be
non-decreasing in the actual speed s.
With underreporting, the penalty function takes the form:
p(¾jc) = ® for 0 < ¾ · 10
p(¾jc) = ® + 10(¾ ¡ 10) for 10 < ¾
(1')






g(R) denote the expectation of the driver of type
(c;r) regarding di®erent underreporting possibilities,¾(sjc;r;C;R), by di®erent o±cer types (C;R).
With underreporting and the di®erent races of drivers, the driver of type (c;r)'s utility function
will take the above penalty function into consideration:
ur(s;c;r;z;¾;°) = D + (1 ¡ zE°)vr(s;c;r) ¡ zE°p(E¾) (2')
The variable bene¯t function of a driver type (c;r) is given by
vr(s;c) = a0 + a1~ s(c;r)s ¡ a2s2 for s · ~ s(c;r) (3')
Since ¾ is assumed to be non-decreasing in the actual speed s that is clocked by the o±cer up
to certain speed level and increasing at or beyond that, it implies that the driver also knows that
dp(E¾)=ds = k ¸ 0 up to some relatively high speed level and dp(E¾)=ds = k > 0 at or beyond
that speed level.
Given Equations (1'), (2') and (3'), the optimizing behavior of the driver of type (c;r) yields
12For some obvious reasons for o±cers such as reputation concerns and court-time loss, we rule out overreporting
as a theoretical possibility. We will check the validity of this assumption in Section 7.4.
12speeding s¤











Figure 4a depicts the driver's best response function based on the expectation of reported speed
when the driver is stopped and ticketed. Similar to Figure 3b, Figure 4b depicts the equilibrium
in which the driver takes into consideration the expected value of the two di®erent types of o±cers
(high ¾ and low ¾). When the driver believes that the o±cer will favor him (and cite at low ¾),
the driver will speed faster given a value of E°.
We assume that an o±cer of race (R)'s cost of writing a ticket to a driver of race (r) has
an additional component: tR
r is the additional cost of underreporting one additional mile, where
0 < tR
r < 1; that is, if she drives at speed s and the o±cer decides to underreport the speed at ¾ < s,
then the \integrity cost" of underreporting is tR
r (s¡¾)=s; if the o±cer has no racial preferences, then
regardless of di®erent driver races, the o±cer has the same tR. Suppose the o±cer chooses to stop a
driver. Then the o±cer of type (C;R), will choose the probability of ticketing, °R(¾;s;c;rjC), each
motorist of type (c;r) at speed ¾, who is actually driving at speed s, by considering the following
net bene¯t from ticketing that driver13
bR












=d¾; i.e., b0 is the marginal bene¯t of reporting one more mile.





Figure 5a depicts a bene¯t function regarding a favorite driver type (c;r) which reaches a
maximum below the actual speed of the driver. In Figure 5b, we observe a bene¯t regarding a
non-favorite driver type (c;r) which reaches a maximum at the actual speed of the driver. The two
di®erent levels of marginal costs imply the same level of citation, ¾ = s.
After the o±cer ¯gures out the optimal citation, ¾¤ · s, he will next ¯gure out whether to






¡t < 0, then the optimizing
behavior implies ° = 0; that is, the o±cer's best response is to never ticket motorist type (c;r) who
13There is also the issue of discounting a ¯ne, although there is an explicit formula for the dollar amount set by
state law. We will examine this issue in Section 7.6.






¡t > 0, then the o±cer will be willing to issue a ticket to
type (c;r); that is, the o±cer's best response is to always ticket motorist type (c;r) who speeds at
s. If bR





¡ t = 0, then the o±cer will be willing to randomize over whether
to issue a ticket to type (c;r), who speeds at s or not ticketing the motorist at all.
Thus, for motorists of type (c;r) and o±cer type (C;R), there is a unique equilibrium of this
discretionary interaction in which (1) an o±cer of type (C;R), given his maximum bene¯t associated
with each (¾;s;c;r), decides on the optimal speed he will cite, ¾¤ · s, (2) drivers' correct conjecture
regarding the expected ticketing probability of o±cers, zE°, on a given route and the expected cited
speed render motorists of di®erent types driving on that route to choose particular best response
speed levels, and (3) the behavior of motorists and an o±cer's maximum bene¯t associated with
each (¾;s;c;r) render the o±cer indi®erent between ticketing them after stopping them at some
speed level.14
4 Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Setup
An important goal of an o±cer, who underreports the speed of a driver with a favorable type (c or
r or both), is that the driver faces a smaller penalty than her actual speed would imply. Suppose
that there are two segments of drivers. Both segments take the penalty function (which depends
on ¾) into consideration, which leads to a higher speeding best-response for the segment (with
characteristic (c)) that is favored by the o±cer up to the particular high speed beyond which the
o±cer does not show any leniency to any type of drivers. Let (c0) denote the characteristic of
the other segment that is not favored by the o±cer. Then, in Figure 6, the o±cer's best-response
ticketing probability step functions intersect the best-response functions of the (c) and (c0) segments
of drivers at two di®erent levels of speed, e.g. s = 11 for type (c) and s0 = 14 for type (c0). But
suppose the case in which the (c) type's speed is cited as ¾ = 0 (i.e., the driver is let go with an
oral warning) while the (c0) type's speed is cited as ¾ = 14.
Consider another o±cer with somewhat similar bene¯t functions but with di®erent ticketing
costs such that his step functions intersect those best-response functions of two segments of drivers
at speeds, for instance, s = 12 and s0 = 15, and yet another o±cer at speeds, s = 13 and s0 = 16;
suppose that in both of these cases, the (c) type is cited at speed ¾ = 10 while the (c0) type is
cited at her actual speed. Then there will be one citation each at ¾ = 14; ¾ = 15; ¾ = 16, two
14The Appendix considers various further generalizations our theoretical model, including the incorporation of the
o±cers' stopping decision.
14citations at ¾ = 10, and one warning. As we add more such o±cers, their discretionary behavior
will imply a rather disproportionate number of citations at ¾ = 10.15 This example clearly shows
that underreporting is one plausible cause for massive spikes on speed dispersion like Figure 1.16
Now suppose a certain race of o±cers (or perhaps a couple of races of o±cers) have the following
racial preferences: r Â r0. Then race (r) motorists will obtain disproportionately more citations
at ¾ = 10 and warnings (and, compensatingly, relatively fewer citations at nearby higher speeds)
from these o±cers, and that situation will be the least for race (r0) motorists. Thus, discretionary
behavior and racial bias by such o±cers lead to a disproportionate number of citations by these
o±cers at a focal level of speed, such as ¾ = 10, and warnings. In other words, such disproportionate
number of citations at a particular level of speed will readily indicate the presence of discretionary
behavior or racial bias by some segments of o±cers. Therefore, average o±cer characteristics at
the prominent speed are more likely to re°ect observable characteristics of discretionary o±cers.
Similarly, drivers who were cited at the speed are more likely to have some favorable characteristics
(and they actually drove faster). Finally, we should observe more favorable combinations of o±cers'
and drivers' characteristics at the prominent speed level.
Also, the \integrity marginal cost" parameter, tR
r , of an o±cer can presumably be even higher
in a neighborhood more populated with people of his own race. Then, o±cers can be expected to
be stricter in such neighborhoods. Further, with the help of some stylized facts regarding which
segments of drivers are more likely to be on the roads on certain days and times, we can make
predictions regarding `day of the week' and `time of the day' as well. For example, on Sundays,
the prevalence of elderly churchgoers may elicit more lenient behavior from o±cers in terms of
underreporting. Likewise, at night, even their preferred-race drivers may be perceived less favorably
by o±cers.
Lastly, but not leastly, our model shows the importance of controlling for actual speed when we
compare the ticketing probability between two segments of drivers. If actual speed is unobservable
or omitted, comparing the ticketing probability might as well be misleading because it is possible to
¯nd, like Figure 6, that favored drivers are more likely to be ticketed than non-favored drivers since
favored drivers are on average more likely to speed. This omitted-variable problem is troublesome
15Albers and Albers (1983 noted that certain numbers and fractions are more prominent than others - such as
round numbers and percentages. We do not attempt to explain why 10 is a prominent number in our context.
16Another possible cause is the kinked penalty function at 10 m.p.h. over the limit, which leads some drivers to
choose that exact speed rather than its adjacent speeds. However, ¯rst of all, this does not explain the spikes at
other speed levels. Also, since the kinked-penalty-function explanation totally depends on drivers' heterogeneity, we
can distinguish this hypothesis and our discretionary-behavior hypothesis by testing whether tickets cited at those
focal speed levels are related to certain characteristics matching between o±cers and drivers.
15since reported speed is likely to be di®erent from actual speed even when information on speed is
available in the data.
5 Data
The main data set we use in this paper is based on the record of 2,001,562 tra±c citations issued in
Massachusetts between April 2001 and November 2002. The data set contains basic demographic
information about drivers, such as race, gender, age, and home town. Our data also contain
information on time and date when citation was issued as well as the neighborhood in which the
motorist's vehicle was stopped. We are able to match the citation-level data with the o±cer-level
data including individual o±cers' race, gender, and experience on the force. The o±cer-level data
are available only for the Boston police department. All o±cers in our sample are, therefore,
municipal police o±cers. There are 161,133 o±cer-citation matched citations issued by Boston
police o±cers within Boston.
Because of the particular focus of our paper, we only consider speeding tickets and warnings.
They account for 25.7% of all issued citations, the largest portion as any single category. Most
citations in our sample are tickets because warnings were recorded for the ¯rst two months only,
April and May in 2001, and then stopped being collected due to budgetary shortfalls. We deleted
citations with missing information regarding any variable that we will use for our regression analysis;
in particular, there are 2,041 citations without speed and 3,128 citations without drivers' race. To
be comparable to the previous literature on vehicle searches, we focus on three races, white, African-
American, and Hispanic. We deleted 1,875 citations where drivers are not white, African-American,
or Hispanic and 1,031 citations issued by Asian o±cers. Consequently, the ¯nal sample consists of
25,738 tickets and 2,644 warnings. Table 1 presents sample selection criteria.
5.1 Histogram of Tickets
Recall that Figure 1 graphs the frequency histogram of vehicle speed in miles per hour over the
posted speed limit as written on tickets, as denoted by ¾ in our theory section. Two notable
features stand out. First, there exist sizable spikes at multiples of 5 m.p.h. above the limit and,
more distinctly, a massive one at the speed of 10 m.p.h. above the limit. Given the size of the
spikes, it does not seem likely to explain their presence mainly by drivers' heterogeneity, needless
to say that it would be hard to believe that drivers can control their speed so delicately particularly
16considering the city tra±c conditions in Boston.
The more likely possibility is that the spikes result from o±cers' discretionary reporting be-
havior. There are two possible explanations, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive: ¯rst, as
the stopping decision - captured by Equation (A5) in the Appendix - implies, o±cers can set their
speed gun to beep at those speci¯c speeds. However, such a stopping decision can only provide a
partial explanation for those spikes. Suppose that an o±cer sets 10 m.p.h. above the limit as the
stopping threshold. Then he will not stop the motorists driving under 10 m.p.h. above the limit,
which can explain as to why the histogram abruptly drops below 10 m.p.h. above the limit.
The second, and more comprehensive explanation lies in the ticketing decision of o±cers -
captured by Equation (5') in the theory section -, that entails o±cers having leeway to give a break
to certain types of drivers. When o±cers decide to give a motorist a break, they can do so by
letting that motorist go without ticket or by reporting a lower speed. It is still hard to explain why
o±cers prefer those distinct numbers just on the basis of the ticketing decision analysis provided
by Equation (5'). But for various other reasons (such as o±cer using `prominence levels' as well
as o±cers `not wanting to look too meticulous'), it may seem reasonable to imagine that once an
o±cer decides to give a break to a driver who drove - somewhat but not much - over 10 m.p.h.
above the limit, say, 16 m.p.h. above the limit, the o±cer would choose 10 rather than 9 or 11
m.p.h. above the limit. Nevertheless, these spikes, particularly the massive one at 10, will play a
crucial role in our empirical identi¯cation in this paper.
Recall that Figure 3.a illustrates the equilibrium speed (s¤ ¸ 10) and ticketing probability for
a given type of drivers and a given type of o±cers when there is neither underreporting nor racial
bias. It is possible to derive equilibrium speed dispersion by allowing the ticketing cost, t, to vary
across individual o±cers. There will be a spike, for example, at 10 m.p.h. over the limit if and only
if the distribution of t also has a corresponding spike exactly at t = b(10;cjC). In this case, if the
o±cer's bene¯t function is continuous, drivers cited at immediately higher speeds (e.g. 11 m.p.h.
over the limit) should be similar in characteristics with those cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit since
the spike results from o±cers' heterogeneity. This is a testable hypothesis. On the other hand, if
we introduce the possibility of underreporting, it is not necessary for us to assume an unusual and
unlikely distribution of t in order to explain the spike in the distribution of reported speed. Instead
it is possible that, as shown in Figure 4, favored drivers who are stopped at higher speeds are cited
at the speed of the spike (i.e. 10 m.p.h. over the limit). Since there are non-favored drivers who
were actually traveling at 10 m.p.h. over the limit and were ticketed and cited at that speed, we
17should ¯nd a mix of favored and non-favored speeders. However, those drivers cited at immediately
higher speeds (e.g. 11 or 12 m.p.h. over the limit) are not necessarily similar in characteristics with
those cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit because there remain relatively more non-favored drivers at
those higher speeds.
The second notable feature that stands out is that there are very few tickets below 10 m.p.h.
above the limit. Recall that it is reasonable to imagine that many motorists - considering the higher
probability of getting caught at a higher speed and the higher probability of being involved in a
fatal accident - may have bene¯t functions due to which they may ¯nd it optimal to drive below
10 m.p.h. above the limit once they decide to speed (see Figure 2 in the theory section). Thus we
think that there are few tickets below 10 m.p.h. above the speed limit because o±cers forgave these
slow speeders or did not even attempt to stop them - due to their stopping and ticketing decisions
captured by Equation (A5) in the Appendix and Equation (5') in the theory section respectively.
In Figure 1, we overlay a hypothetical distribution of actual speeds. The distribution is graphed
under some reasonable assumptions. We assume that: (1) the distribution should be smooth; (2)
those citations accumulated at the prominent speeds are discounted from some speeds above; (3)
there are few unstopped vehicles above 10.17 We can see that, below 10 m.p.h. above the limit,
there are a substantial number of speeding vehicles that are not even stopped. It seems likely that
the number of completely forgiven or ignored speeding vehicles is larger than the total number of
tickets in our sample.
5.2 Characteristics by Speed
Given our discussion in the previous subsection, in Tables 2 and 3, we examine drivers' and o±cers'
characteristics disaggregated by reported speed on tickets. As motivated by our ¯ndings in the
previous section, our discussion will focus on those citations at 10 m.p.h. above the limit and its
adjacent speeds.18 If a certain characteristic of drivers or o±cers is related to the manipulation of
reported speed, we should ¯nd a signi¯cant discontinuity in that variable around the speci¯c speed.
If o±cers were strict, di®erent speed levels should only re°ect heterogeneity in drivers' propensity
to speed and, if any, changes in the means over speed should be gradual.
17According to the 2002 National Survey of Speeding and Other Unsafe Driving Actions conducted by National
Highway Tra±c Safety Administration in U.S. Department of Transportation, about 51% of drivers say that they
sometimes or often drive 10 m.p.h. over the speed limit on interstate highways. People believe that they can travel
about 8 m.p.h. over the limit on interstate highways without getting a speeding ticket. Allowable speed margins over
the limit for city or neighborhood streets are deemed slightly lower.
18One should be careful in interpreting statistics below 10 m.p.h. over the limit given that there are very few
observations.
18Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of drivers' characteristics. The column for
the prominent speed (10 m.p.h. above the limit) is highlighted. First, the proportion of in-town
drivers is lower at 10 m.p.h. above the limit. Since there is no reason that in-town drivers drive less
frequently at 10 m.p.h. above the limit than others, it seems reasonable to suppose that o±cers
are less likely to cite those drivers at that particular speed. This may be due to the fact that
o±cers tend to give a break to out-of-towners simply because of learning-e®ects; i.e., they may
be more lenient to out-of-towners since these drivers may not be expected to know the road and
driving conditions as much and consequently could be forgiven for paying more attention to these
conditions than to their speedometers, particularly in the tra±c condition of Boston. There is a
similar but weaker pattern for in-state drivers. We also ¯nd that the proportion of male drivers
and that of white drivers are higher at the speed, while the proportion of African-American drivers
is lower. This ¯nding suggests the possibility that drivers are treated di®erently depending on their
gender and race.
Table 3 shows o±cers' characteristics over speed. We ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in various
aspects. We ¯nd that male and/or inexperienced (or younger) o±cers are more likely to give a
break to drivers. The most striking di®erence is found in the proportion of white o±cers at 10
m.p.h. above the limit. About 70 percent of all the tickets cited at 10 m.p.h. are issued by white
o±cers, while they account for 40 percent and 30 percent at 9 and 11 m.p.h. above the limit,
respectively. Lastly, note that the proportion of African-American o±cers is high particularly at 11
and 12 m.p.h. above the limit. This seems to re°ect the opposite side of the same coin as the high
proportion of white o±cers at 10 m.p.h. above the limit. It is reasonable to imagine that there are
relatively more African-American o±cers at 11 and 12 m.p.h. above the limit because those tickets
issued by white o±cers, which are supposed to be at 11 or 12 m.p.h. above the limit, are moved to
10 m.p.h. above the limit.
6 Empirical Strategy
Now we consider a statistical model for an o±cer's choice of reported speed given that the o±cer
has already stopped a vehicle and decided to cite the driver. As a starting point, suppose that we
could observe whether the o±cer gives a driver a break. We can then specify the o±cer's propensity
to give a break based on observable characteristics including the o±cer's and the driver's races.
Let yij denote the variable that takes on the value of one if o±cer j gives a break to driver i and,











ij = ¯0 ¡¯1si +ci¯2 +Cj¯3 +Lij¯4 +fdriver raceg+fofficer raceg+fracial biasg¡"ij.
The latent variable y¤
ij represents the o±cer's propensity to give a break. The variable si represents
the driver's actual speed over the limit that is observed by the o±cer when the o±cer stopped the
vehicle. Consistent with an assumption we have made in the theory section, we assume here that the
propensity will be decreasing in si. The vectors ci and Cj include driver and o±cer characteristics
other than race, respectively. Driver characteristics include age, gender, dummy for in-town drivers,
dummy for in-state drivers, and indicator for commercial license. O±cers' characteristics include
gender and years on the police force. To address the possibility that o±cers' leniency varies by
surroundings, the vector Lij includes time, date, and location for tickets; there are three time
dummies (morning, afternoon, and evening, with predawn excluded), six date dummies (Tuesday
excluded), ten neighborhood dummies, and one continuous variable for the speed zone (the speed
limit in m.p.h.). Lastly, the variable "ij is a disturbance variable representing what is unobservable
to the econometrician but may in°uence the o±cer's ticketing decision.
To estimate the e®ects of racial bias on o±cers' leniency, we include three sets of dummy
variables created by driver race and o±cer race. The ¯rst set, denoted as fdriver raceg, includes
two dummy variables, 1[i = a] and 1[i = h], which represent African-American drivers and Hispanic
drivers, respectively. Holding other things, particularly the actual speed si, constant, the coe±cients
for these two driver race dummies are intended to capture statistical discrimination or monolithic
racial bias. The ¯rst emphasizes the `schooling drivers' aspect: o±cers may be stricter with drivers
of a speci¯c race if they believe that those drivers will likely speed again when given a warning
or treated leniently. The latter, monolithic racial bias, could be socially imposed: o±cers may
feel obliged to enforce their chiefs' or their communities' racial bias against a particular race. For
example, minority community leaders often call for harsh law enforcement because they are more
easily blamed than whites.
The second set, denoted as fo±cer raceg in Equation (6), also includes two o±ce race dummy
variables 1[j = A] and 1[j = H], which represent African-American o±cers and Hispanic o±cers,
respectively. The coe±cients for these two dummies should capture o±cers' race-speci¯c strictness
(relative to white o±cers). For example, if African-American o±cers are strict or less lenient, then
20the corresponding coe±cient should be negative.
The ¯nal set of dummy variables is denoted as fracial biasg. These variables are supposed to
capture o±cers' preferences for drivers with di®erent races, which also may change by o±cers' race.
For this purpose, this set should include 6 interaction variables given three racial groups.
racial bias = dW
w 1[i = w;j = W] + dW
a 1[i = a;j = W] + dW
h 1[i = h;j = W]
+dA
w1[i = w;j = A] + dA
a 1[i = a;j = A] + dA
h1[i = h;j = A]
+dH
w1[i = w;j = H] + dH
a 1[i = a;j = H] + dH
h 1[i = h;j = H]
= 1 + (dW
a ¡ dW
w )1[i = a;j = W] + (dW
h ¡ dW
w )1[i = h;j = W]
+1 + (dA
w ¡ dA
a )1[i = w;j = A] + (dA
h ¡ dA
a )1[i = h;j = A]
+1 + (dH
w ¡ dH
h )1[i = w;j = H] + (dH
a ¡ dH






j) represents the racial bias by o±cers with race j for drivers with race i against
drivers with o±cers' own race j. However, it is not possible to estimate all the six coe±cients due to
perfect multicollinearity. It is necessary to impose some reasonable restrictions on parameters (we















racial bias = df1[i = a;j = W] + 1[i = h;j = W] + 1[i = w;j = A] + 1[i = h;j = A]
+1[i = w;j = H] + 1[i = a;j = H]g = dMismatch;
(8)
where Mismatch is a dummy variable for whether the o±cer's race and the driver's race are di®erent.
This is the sum of the above six indicator variables.
The validity of this restriction is an empirical as well as conceptual question; that is, whether,




j < 0 for all i and j (or




j > 0 for all i and j). In this paper, we allow and test two
more hypothetical forms of racial bias: (1) minority-on-minority bias and (2) African-American-
white confrontation. Both hypotheses are motivated by our preliminary scrutiny of the data and the
literature. The ¯rst hypothesis is that minority o±cers are stricter (less lenient) on minority drivers.
Technically, we include the interaction term Minority£Minority, which is 1[i 6= w] £ 1[j 6= W]:
21Recall that Dedman and Latour, using the same data set, found that minority o±cers are tougher
on minority drivers by issuing more tickets than warnings. The latter is that there exists two-way
bias between white and African-American o±cers, which might be a type of racial bias usually
perceived by the public. Note that these three forms of racial bias (own-race preferences, minority-
on-minority bias, and African-American-white confrontation) may coexist. Indeed they are not
mutually exclusive although they might as well compete with each other. Our full speci¯cation of
racial bias is the following:
y¤
ij = ¯0 ¡ ¯1si + ci¯2 + Cj¯3 + Lij¯4 + ¯51[i = a] + ¯61[i = h] + ¯71[j = A] + ¯81[j = H]
+d1Mismatch + d2Minority £ Minority + d31[i = a;j = W] + d41[i = w;j = A] ¡ "ij
(9)
6.1 Warnings versus Tickets
An obvious measure of o±cers' leniency is whether they give warnings rather than tickets given
a level of speed. In Table 4, we estimate the Probit model where the dependent variable is the
indicator for whether the driver is warned rather than ticketed. Here we assume that the reported
speed is the actual speed, which is not true and will be discussed later.19 Note, however, that
the main purpose of this subsection is to compare our analysis with the Boston Globe's analysis
presented in Column (1). We try to replicate the regression analysis done by Professor Elaine
I. Allen which was asked by the Boston Globe. Although the samples and speci¯cations are not
exactly identical, our ¯ndings are overall in harmony with the Boston Globe's: o±cers are stricter
for faster drivers; white, older drivers, and/or in-town drivers are more likely to be warned; male
drivers are less likely to be warned.
In Column (2), we include our racial bias terms as well as other control variables as speci¯ed
in Equation (9). Some results become di®erent from the Boston Globe's. We ¯nd that the driver
age e®ect is nonlinear: o±cers are more lenient for younger and older drivers while they are strict
for prime age drivers. We ¯nd no gender disparity.
More importantly for our purpose in this paper, we ¯nd that o±cer characteristics are signi¯-
cant: male and/or less experienced o±cers are more lenient. Given a cited speed and holding other
things constant, they are more likely to issue warnings instead of tickets. The racial bias terms
19We can minimize this problem by using a series of dummy variables for speed ranges (such as below 10, 10-14,
and 15 or above) instead of using the continuous variable. This solution is reasonable in that the speed is discounted
to its nearest prominent level. Our results change little by using dummy variables for speed ranges.
22are also signi¯cant. Our full speci¯cation in Column (2) shows that minority o±cers are stricter to
minority drivers. In other words, minority drivers are more likely to be warned and not ticketed
when they are stopped by white o±cers. This is consistent with Dedman and Latour's articles.
6.2 Reported Speed
Now we allow the possibility that o±cers manipulate the speed on tickets. The actual speed is not
observable to the econometrician. Thus we assume that:
si = Xi®1 + Li®2 + ®31[i = a] + ®41[i = h] + !i (10)
where the vector Xi includes the driver's characteristics a®ecting speeding behavior. The vector Li
is the same as de¯ned in Equation (6). The coe±cient ®3 and ®4 are supposed to capture average
racial di®erentials in speeding behavior. Depending on the driver's race, the maximum speed at
which he or she can drive - ~ s(c;r) in our theoretical model - may di®er.20 In addition, drivers of
di®erent races may have di®erent perceptions regarding their likelihood they will be ticketed - E°
in our theoretical model. The variable !i represents unobservable individual heterogeneity such as,
among others, risk attitude and time discount.
One noteworthy thing is that there is no o±cer variable included in Equation (7) because it is
unknown to the driver which type of o±cer s/he will encounter when s/he is stopped. Also note
that we include location variables controlling which neighborhood the motorist was driving through.
The path the driver follows is clearly his/her choice, and if o±cers are assigned across districts in a
systematic way based on their observable types (e.g., race) and if drivers know this assignment rule,
the driver may be able to predict to some extent which type of o±cers he or she will likely face on
their path. For example, people might expect more African-American o±cers in a neighborhood in
which African-Americans are concentrated (AK, forthcoming). While this expectation should be
expected to a®ect speeding behavior or route choice for criminals (or those who try to avoid police
stops, e.g. joyriders), it should not for other types of motorists. First, it should be quite costly, in
terms of both time and gasoline, to change their route given their origin and destination. Again we
believe that those drivers within our focused range of speed, 10-14 m.p.h. above the limit, should
not choose their travel route in order to avoid certain types of o±cers.
Drivers' characteristics that a®ect o±cers' leniency could a®ect drivers' speeding behavior. To
20Surprisingly there is little empirical research on drivers' race and speeding. But we believe that speeding behavior
should not be signi¯cantly di®erent by drivers' race within our narrow range of speed, 10-14 m.p.h. above the limit.
23be general, we do not assume any exclusion restriction; ci = Xi. For example, the driver's age
should not only determine the speeding behavior but also a®ect the likelihood that he or she gets
a break from the o±cer who stops him/her. Old drivers tend to drive slowly while o±cers tend to
give a break to them. Under the assumptions, substituting Equation (7), we have:
y¤
ij = ¯0 ¡ ¯1(®0 + ci®1 + ¤i®2 + ®31[i = a] + ®41[i = h] + !i)
+ci¯2 + Cj¯3 + ¤ij¯4 + ¯51[i = a] + ¯61[i = h] + ¯71[j = A] + ¯81[j = H]
+d1Mismatch + d2Minority £ Minority + d31[i = a;j = W] + d41[i = w;j = A] ¡ "ij
= (¯0 ¡ ¯1®0) + ci(¯2 ¡ ¯1®1) + Cj¯3 + ¤ij(¯4 ¡ ¯1®2)
+(¯5 ¡ ¯1®3)1[i = a] + (¯6 ¡ ¯1®4)1[i = h] + ¯71[j = A] + ¯81[j = H]
+d1Mismatch + d2Minority £ Minority + d31[i = a;j = W] + d41[i = w;j = A] ¡ ("ij + ¯1!i)
(11)
It is obvious in Equation (11) that we cannot identify the coe±cients for o±cers' statistical dis-
crimination or monolithic preferences because drivers' race also possibly matters in their speeding
behavior. On the other hand, we can still identify o±cers' race-speci¯c strictness and, more impor-
tantly, can test for di®erent types of racial bias: own-race preferences, minority-on-minority bias,
and African-American-white confrontation.
We do not directly observe o±cers' choice of whether or not to give a break. Thus, we use a
proxy variable, an indicator as to whether a motorist is cited for driving exactly 10 m.p.h. above
the limit. The use of the proxy variable is well rationalized from our discussion in previous sections.
The variable is, however, subject to misclassi¯cation error. For example, those drivers whose actual
speed is 10 m.p.h. above the limit and whose speed gets cited at exactly 10 m.p.h. above the limit
are classi¯ed as those who are favored by o±cers although they actually are not.21 Misclassi¯cation
error is likely to lead to attenuation bias.
As mentioned before, we restrict our sample to tickets between 10 and 14 m.p.h. over the
speed limit. Due to the massive spike at 10 m.p.h. above the limit, the restricted sample includes
the majority of tickets (55%) in our whole sample. This sample restriction will reduce drivers'
heterogeneity. Since our purpose is to identify o±cers' discretionary behavior and racial bias
as distinctly as possible, we want to minimize drivers' heterogeneity and remove the potentially
21There is another misclassi¯ed group in which drivers get cited above 10 m.p.h. over the limit while they drive
faster than that. We believe that there are only a negligible number of tickets in that category because o±cers would
rather cite 10 m.p.h. above the limit (than 11 or 12) once they have decided to give a break.
24confounding e®ects. It is also reasonable to assume that o±cers are less likely to give a break (or
likely to give a smaller break) to motorists driving 15 m.p.h. or faster above the limit (recall our
assumption in the theory section that \the reported speed will be increasing in si beyond a certain
speed" is to that e®ect). Slow speeders driving below 10 m.p.h. over the limit are either not even
stopped or strictly given a ticket since they are more likely to violate the speed limit in a restricted
zone (such as school zone). In either case, o±cers' manipulation of speed on tickets should be
expected to be insigni¯cant. The range of speed between 10 and 14 m.p.h. over the limit seems to
be appropriate for the study of leniency in terms of speed discounting.
The restriction potentially raises sample selection bias because we drop those tickets whose
actual speed is between 10 and 14 m.p.h. above the limit but it is reported below 10 m.p.h. The
bias is likely to be ignorable given that there are very few tickets cited under 10 m.p.h. over the
limit; in addition, - as mentioned before - citing a speed at or below 10 m.p.h. above the speed limit
does not matter for the motorist or the o±cer in Massachusetts in any way. Finally, although there
are also some observable spikes at multiples of 5 above 14 m.p.h. over the limit, the magnitude of
underreporting should be weak for drivers who are driving above 15 m.p.h. over the limit.
7 Empirical Findings
Table 5 presents our main results from the Probit model.22 The dependent variable is the indicator
for whether drivers get cited for driving exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the limit. We include all
three sets of variables for the racial bias, Mismatch, Minority £ Minority (1[i 6= w]1[j 6= W]),
1[i = a;j = W], and 1[i = w;j = A]. In Column (1), as discussed before, we use our sample of
tickets between 10 and 14 m.p.h. over the limit. In Column (2), we restrict the sample further to
those between 10 and 11 m.p.h. above the limit. In this extremely limited sample, it seems to be
true that whether they drive at 10 or 11 m.p.h. above the limit is not systematically determined by
their characteristics. Therefore, any signi¯cant e®ect we ¯nd in this sample should be attributed
to o±cers' manipulation - due to discretionary or racial reasons. The results are strikingly similar
between the two samples.
22An alternative speci¯cation is a zero-in°ated Poisson model, which can allow for di®erent data-generating pro-
cesses, one for exactly 10 m.p.h. over the limit and another for higher speeds. The results are similar.
257.1 Driver Characteristics
As determinants of whether drivers get cited for driving exactly 10 m.p.h. over the limit, we
include driver characteristics such as age, gender, whether the driver resides in the same town where
he/she is stopped, whether he/she resides in Massachusetts, and whether he/she holds a commercial
driver's license. We ¯nd that no such driver characteristic variable is signi¯cant, except for race. As
shown in Equation (11), we cannot di®erentiate the direct in°uence of any driver characteristic on
the o±cer's ticketing decision from its e®ect on the actual speed and its subsequent impact on the
o±cer's decision. The two e®ects might be opposite, which is perhaps why our driver characteristics
turn out to be insigni¯cant. In addition, the insigni¯cance of driver characteristics variables might
result from our limited range of speed. It is not surprising that drivers' characteristics do not
determine the speeding behavior in a range between 10 and 14 m.p.h. above the limit (needless to
say, the range between 10 and 11 m.p.h. above the limit).
One exception is the number of violations which signi¯cantly decreases the likelihood in which
drivers get cited for driving exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the limit. First, o±cers could be tougher on
those speeders who also violates the baby car seat rule. This variable may be also related to the
driver's behavior. The drivers without appropriate registration would refrain from speeding. On
the contrary, it might be equally true that drunken drivers would be more likely to speed due to
the in°uence of alcohol.
7.2 O±cer Characteristics
Unlike driver characteristics, most of o±cer characteristics variables are signi¯cant in explaining
why some drivers get cited at 10 m.p.h. above the limit while others do not. First of all, we ¯nd
that male o±cers are signi¯cantly more likely to issue tickets at 10 m.p.h. above the limit. This
suggests that male o±cers are more lenient than female o±cers. At the sample averages of the
other variables, male o±cers are 33% (or 19% in Column (2)) more likely to give a break than
female o±cers. Second, less experienced or young o±cers are more likely to give a break to drivers
than experienced o±cers. It seems reasonable that new o±cers are more lenient since - especially
during this crucial learning-by-doing process of theirs in which they pay attention to all aspects
of becoming a full-°edged o±cer - they may be more vulnerable to many things including drivers'
complaints. Also they might be not as deft at handling speeders as their seniors.
267.3 Interactions Between Driver Races and O±cer Races
Like other driver characteristics, we ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ect for driver race. However, keep in mind
that we cannot di®erentiate between the direct e®ect of driver race on the o±cer's ticketing decision
or its e®ect on the actual speed and its subsequent impact on the o±cer's decision. On the other
hand, o±cer race variables are signi¯cant. We ¯nd that relative to white o±cers, African-American
and Hispanic o±cers are signi¯cantly less likely to give a break. On average, holding other things
constant, African-American (or Hispanic o±cers) are about 13% (or 9%) less likely to give a break.
The variable Mismatch is signi¯cant when it is included alone. However, as soon as we in-
clude Minority£Minority, Mismatch turns out to be insigni¯cant. This means that the signi¯cant
result for Mismatch is driven by minority o±cers being tough on minority drivers. We ¯nd that
Minority£Minority is signi¯cant. Minority o±cers are 16% (or 8% in Column (2)) less likely to be
lenient to minority drivers. We additionally ¯nd that African-American o±cers are less lenient to
white drivers. Combined with the previous ¯nding that minority o±cers are tougher on minority
drivers, the last ¯nding shows that African-American o±cers are stricter to all races of drivers than
other o±cers while they are slightly more stricter to minority drivers.
7.4 Validity Check of Identi¯cation Strategy and Robustness Check
In Table 6, in Column (1), we restrict our sample to those between 11 and 14 m.p.h. above the
limit. The dependent variable is the indicator for whether drivers get cited for driving exactly at 11
m.p.h. above the limit. We call this kind of dependent variable \fake" dependent variable since it
seems unlikely from the data that o±cers cite drivers at 11 m.p.h. rather than 12, 13, or 14 m.p.h.
above the limit. In fact, an o±cer might look too meticulous when he decides to give a break to
a driver and lowers the reported speed from 14 to 11 m.p.h. over the limit. The purpose of this
subsection is to check the validity of our identi¯cation strategy of using 10 m.p.h. over the limit as
a proxy variable for o±cers' leniency.
The results support our empirical strategy. Using fake dependent variables, all the racial bias
variables except one become insigni¯cant. Only the variable for African-American o±cers is sig-
ni¯cant and positive. This is in fact the indirect consequence of the racial bias found at 10 m.p.h.
above the limit. Recall that in Table 5 we ¯nd that African-American o±cers are the least lenient.
As white and Hispanic o±cers discount tickets that should be cited at a speed higher than 10 m.p.h.
over the limit and less than 15 m.p.h. over the limit and, in fact, cite 10 m.p.h. above the limit, it
27is a natural consequence of it to ¯nd out that there are relatively more African-American o±cers
citing speeds at 11 and 12 m.p.h. over the limit.
Also note that the e®ect of speed limit is signi¯cantly positive in Table 6 while it is signi¯cantly
negative in Table 5. Given that our results in Table 6 are driven by drivers' behavior rather than
o±cers' behavior, this contrasting ¯nding suggests that the negative e®ect we found in Table 5
is a result of o±cers' discretionary behavior of speed reporting. We conclude that holding the
actual speed constant, o±cers are less likely to give a break to those who speed in a high speed
zone. This has a reasonable explanation: the o±cers in general deem that high speed in itself is
a dangerous and risky act and should be curbed more as the speed the motorists are allowed to
travel at increases.
Likewise we can also check if our ¯ndings in Table 5 regarding driver characteristics and time
and location variables result from drivers' speeding behavior or o±cers' discretionary manipulation
of the speed. First, in Table 6, there is no signi¯cant e®ect of the number of violations, which
means that what we found in Table 5 is the consequence of o±cers' discretionary behavior. Second,
with the fake dependent variables, we ¯nd no systematic e®ect of dates or time of the day. When
signi¯cant, they are positive. On the contrary, we found in Table 5 the negative e®ects of those
variables. This also suggests that o±cers do manipulate the reported speed di®erently according
to time and date.
For further robustness check, in Table 7, in Columns (1) and (2), we restrict our sample to
those speeding tickets issued while there was no vehicle search. One might think that o±cers would
behave di®erently when drivers look suspicious. In addition, on the driver's side, speeding behavior
and criminal activities could be correlated. The results change little. There is a signi¯cant e®ect
of Minority£Minority.
In Columns (3) and (4), we disaggregate the minority group since one may think that African-
American and Hispanic o±cers have di®erent incentives and preferences. We include four interac-
tion terms between African-American/Hispanic o±cers and drivers instead of Minority£Minority.
Unfortunately, we cannot test for own-race preferences and African-American and white recipro-
cal bias because we can only estimate up to four parameters. This should not be a major issue
since the variables except 1[i = w;j = A] were insigni¯cant in Table 5. The results show that
African-American and Hispanic o±cers do have di®erent preferences; the magnitude of bias against
minority drivers is larger among Hispanic o±cers. However, minority o±cers do not di®erentially
treat African-American and Hispanic drivers.
28Finally, we check the possibility of overreporting, although we believe that overreporting should
not be very common because it could irritate drivers for no explicit bene¯t to o±cers. We replicate
our main analysis in Table 5 using the new sample of those tickets cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit
and below. The idea is that if our previous results were driven by o±cers' overreporting rather
than underreporting, we should ¯nd the same and even stronger results with the correct sample and
speci¯cation. The results in Column (5) show that those who are cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit
are more likely to be white drivers and cited by white o±cers compared to those cited below the
speed. It is not surprising given the racial composition of drivers and o±cers over di®erent speed
levels in Tables 2 and 3. The most important ¯nding here is that there is no evidence for racial
bias; none of racial interaction terms is signi¯cant. We conclude that although we still cannot fully
exclude the possibility of overreporting, if any, it should not be motivated by racial bias. In other
words, overreporting cannot explain our previous ¯nding about minority-on-minority bias.
7.5 Di®erences across Subsamples
Table 8 compares the results across di®erent subsamples: by time of day in Column (1), by driver's
gender in Column (2), by driver's age in Column (3), and by vehicle age in Column (4). The variable
Minority£Minority is signi¯cant for both day and night. Interestingly, the e®ect is stronger at night.
And, at night, the variable for African-American drivers turns out to be positive and signi¯cant. In
combination with the stop-and-search literature's ¯ndings, this may re°ect an after-the-fact leniency
shown to these drivers who may initially be considered as a higher statistical criminal threat by
o±cers, right after they stop such drivers; once o±cers ¯gure out - one way or another { that many
of such drivers are not carrying any contraband, the leniency may be a form of implicit reward to
such non-criminal African-American drivers. Also, only at night, African-American o±cers are less
lenient to white drivers; this may be either due to the fact that white drivers that drive at night
have di®erent characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician - such as fewer older
looking white drivers might be driving at night.
In addition, we ¯nd that minority o±cers are less lenient to minority drivers in the context of
male drivers while there is no evidence for minority-on-minority bias in the case of female drivers.
The bias exists regardless of driver age, while it does not exist for relatively new vehicles.
Table 9 shows the results for di®erent racial neighborhoods. It may matter in what kind of neigh-
borhood an o±cer stops and tickets a driver. This additional feature can easily be incorporated into
our theoretical setup by employing an additional neighborhood notation, N 2 fAA; WHg where
29AA and WH stand for predominantly African-American and white neighborhoods respectively,
and so on). As mentioned in the empirical predictions section, one can imagine that an o±cer's
integrity marginal cost is higher in a neighborhood more populated with people of his own race;
tA
r (AA) > tA
r (WH) and tW
r (WH) > tW
r (AA)
In Column (1) we focus on white neighborhoods (60% or more white) and ¯nd no evidence for
the racial bias. We still ¯nd that African-American o±cers are the least lenient followed by Hispanic
o±cers. In Column (2) we look at African-American neighborhoods where 20% or more population
is African-American. We ¯nd that, in this area, minority o±cers are less lenient to minority
drivers. In addition we ¯nd that African-American o±cers are less lenient to white drivers. Lastly,
in Column (3) where we examine Hispanic neighborhoods, we ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ect of any race
variables. The insigni¯cance might result from small sample size.
7.6 Tra±c Fines
As a supplementary study, in this subsection, we examine whether police o±cers also manipulate
the dollar amount of a ¯ne directly. The question is motivated by Makowsky and Stratmann
(forthcoming) which shows that ¯nes are somewhat arbitrarily determined by o±cers according to
their own objectives or local public interests. Information on the ¯ne amount is also available in





pij ¡ p(¾ij) if pij is reported
0 if pij is missing
(12)
By using Equation (12), we compute the gap between the ¯ne amount written on a ticket (pij)
and that calculated by the formula and the reported speed - p(¾ij) = 75 + 10(¾ij ¡ 10) when the
reported speed exceeds 10 m.p.h. above the speed limit and $75 otherwise. Surprisingly, the ¯ne
amount is missing for about 44 percent of 25,738 tickets. Instead of dropping these observations, we
assume that the amount should have been calculated by the formula and impute it by the formula
and the reported speed. This assumption is reasonable in that there is no particular reason why
something other than the amount implied by the formula should be imposed when a ticket with
missing ¯ne is sent to the collection o±ce. When the ¯ne amount is missing, by construction, the
gap is zero.
30Table 10 presents the distribution of the ¯ne gap. We continue to use our restricted sample of
tickets between 10 and 14 m.p.h. above the speed limit.23 There are three noteworthy things in
Table 10. First, it is notable that the gap is zero for 89 percent of tickets. This means that o±cers
rarely lower ¯nes and tend to apply the formula strictly. This is in contrast with our previous
¯nding that o±cers are lenient in terms of speed reporting. This makes sense in that o±cers do
not want to look \inconsistent" by reporting a penalty di®erent from what the reported speed
implies. Second, there is an accumulation (3%) of tickets at $25. This is probably due to the fact
that o±cers omit the surcharge of $25 for the Head Injury Trust Fund. In this case, we should
not interpret the gap as evidence that o±cers lower ¯nes. Third, a tiny number of tickets have
negative gaps; o±cers impose larger ¯nes than the recommended ¯ne according to the statute. This
is possible in special zones like construction site.
Table 11 presents the results from Tobit models where the dependent variable is the ¯ne gap. In
Column (2) we exclude those tickets whose ¯ne gap is exactly $25 because of the above mentioned
concern. There are some signi¯cant estimates. First, the higher the speed limit is, the larger the
¯ne gap is. The size of the e®ect is, however, small. A 10 m.p.h. increase in the speed limit on
average increases the gap by 50 to 80 cents. Second, the gap is larger for younger drivers. Again
the e®ect is not substantial. The negative e®ect of driver age seems to re°ect the notion that
o±cers are less lenient to prime-age adults with higher earning potential. It might indicate that
o±cers' penalty policy is overall progressive or simply that o±cers have certain age preferences.
Third, we ¯nd a similar negative (and small) e®ect for commercial drivers. This too may be due
to the fact that o±cers may tend give a break to less experienced drivers such as non-commercial
drivers. Fourth, o±cers' experience increases the ¯ne gap. This is opposite to our previous ¯nding
that inexperienced o±cers are more lenient. A plausible explanation is that these younger and
newer o±cers are more concerned about inconsistency between the ¯ne and reported speed. We
also ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of time of the day, but the estimates between Columns (1) and (2) are
too di®erent to interpret appropriately.
We also ¯nd that minority o±cers give smaller ¯nes. Compared to white o±cers, the gap is
larger by $1.8 for African-American o±cers and by $4 for Hispanic o±cers. Like other signi¯cant
estimates, the size of the e®ect is not substantial. Furthermore, these di®erences disappear after
we drop those tickets with the $25 gap in Column (2). More importantly, we ¯nd that none of the
23In addition, we focus on tickets without additional violation other than speeding in order to impute the ¯ne
amount accurately where it is missing.
31racial bias variables is signi¯cant in both samples. The conclusion is that racial bias occurs mostly
when o±cers decide which speed to report. Once they decide on the speed, there seems no further
racial consideration in deciding ¯nes.
8 Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical section considered motorists who take into account the probability of getting tick-
eted and the speed that the o±cer will cite in deciding at what speed they will travel and o±cers
who - net of the cost of ticketing motorists - maximize a bene¯t function which generically in-
creases in the speed of ticketed drivers; this framework is general enough to allow o±cers to give
some drivers a break by citing them at a lower speed than they were traveling.
In our empirical section, we exploit the existence of a massive accumulation of speeding tickets
exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the speed limit to elicit o±cers' discretionary behavior and leniency. We
show that the accumulation of tickets at the speci¯c speed level is likely to result from o±cers'
manipulation of reported speed { underreporting. Using our novel measure of o±cers' leniency,
we ¯nd that white o±cers are the most lenient ones overall. Female o±cers are the least lenient
group of o±cers. We ¯nd strong evidence that minority o±cers are less lenient to minority drivers.
There is no minority-on-minority bias when vehicles are new and/or when drivers are female. The
bias, on the other hand, gets stronger at night and/or in minority concentration neighborhoods.
Although we ¯nd evidence of racial bias, we ¯nd no systematic racial bias in the form of mutual or
monolithic racial bias. Our ¯ndings about minority-on-minority bias are interesting particularly in
that AK (forthcoming), using the same data set, found evidence on own-race preferences in vehicle
searches.
In the next few paragraphs we will attempt to reconcile well-established sociological - and
other - perspectives and our two ¯ndings that (1) there is minority-to-minority bias and (2) female
o±cers are relatively stricter. On the sociological front, we ¯rst note an observation by Weber
(1968) that a social group's superior material resources relative to another group can give rise to
the development of status beliefs favoring that group over the other. Further, a wide variety of
historical contingencies can also help such status beliefs. Once such beliefs form, a member of the
materially-disadvantaged group su®ers a social disadvantage even vis-µ a-vis those members of the
other group who are, in fact, his or her material equals.
In addition, recently there have been attempts to explain how bias against minorities may arise
32in the context of network structure of social interactions and categorizations, which in°uence the
formation of status beliefs. Fiske (1993) has shown that people tend to more ¯nely categorize
groups who are above them in a hierarchy and more coarsely categorize groups who are below them
in a hierarchy. Furthermore, types of experiences and groups of people that are less frequent in the
population are more coarsely categorized and more often lumped together. As a result, this can
give rise to bias against minority groups even when there is no malevolent taste for bias (Fryer and
Jackson, 2008).
When, along with the above sociological perspectives, one uses further research by sociologists
- as well as by anthropologists and psychologists - observing American children at play, one may be
able to shed even more light on our two ¯ndings emphasized above. In that strand of research, it is
found that girls tend to play in small groups (or with a single best friend) and\learn to downplay
ways in which one is better than the others and to emphasize ways in which they are all the same."
Boys, on the other hand, tend to play in larger groups in which they are not treated as equals.
\Boys generally don't accuse one another of being bossy, because the leader is expected to tell
lower-status boys what to do" (Tannen, 2001).
In the light of the contents of the last few paragraphs, one can imagine a typical police de-
partment which is populated by mostly white o±cers. Accordingly, in such a police department, a
status- or bias-formation process in the eyes of (especially newly-hired) male-minority o±cers may
develop more or less along the lines of the above-mentioned Weberian and network-based sociologi-
cal theories - many of these o±cers may perceive that their chances of surviving in that department
could be increased if they re°ected these status-di®erential beliefs in their behavior, while groups
of male-minority o±cers may also be mutually guilty of coarsely categorizing the other minority
groups that they encounter less frequently and do not particularly categorize above themselves
in a hierarchy. While white-male o±cers may not share these perspectives of the male-minority
o±cers, they could be involved in various types of non-racial discretionary behavior simply due
to their unwillingness to perceive all drivers as equals. Female o±cers, on the other hand, may
downplay any such status inequalities and treat all drivers as equals - as explained by the above
gender di®erences that start developing at childhood. Surely, elaborate - and inter-disciplinary -
future research would be very useful in substantiating this section's attempts to reconcile our two
above-mentioned empirical ¯ndings and various prominent behavioral perspectives.
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36A Appendix
A.1 Ruling out some simple driver bene¯t functions
Suppose the variable bene¯t function is such that the marginal bene¯t is declining beyond the limit.
Then it is easy to observe that the driver will only drive at speeds less than 10 m.p.h. above the
limit since the penalty function will be increasing beyond 10 m.p.h. above the limit. Next, consider
the variable bene¯t function, v(s;c) = a0, where a0 > 0. Then note that, even if E° = 0, (i) there
will be no speeding if ® > a0, (ii) any speed between the limit and 10 m.p.h. above the limit would
be possible if ® = a0, and (iii) the driver would never exceed a speed which is 10 m.p.h. above the
limit if ® < a0.
Thus, to generate any speeds especially beyond 10 m.p.h. above the limit, we need to assume
that at least a group of drivers will have a variable bene¯t function with increasing marginal bene¯t
in some range of speeds exceeding the limit by 10 m.p.h. A possible tractable - though unrealistic
- candidate for such a bene¯t function would be the linear form
v(s;c) = a0 + a1s; (A1)
a0 > 0 is the level of bene¯t at the speed limit and a1 > 0 is the marginal bene¯t of speeding
beyond the limit Note that if a0 > ® and a1 > 10, then the optimal speed is 1 at low levels of E°.
With a0 > ® and a1 < 10, optimizing behavior yields
(1 ¡ E°)=E° = a1=10: (A2)
Note that this condition does not allow the driver to pick a particular optimal speed. Examining
this condition a little closer reveals that the driver will de¯nitely be speeding but will be indi®erent
among all speeds exceeding the limit by 10 m.p.h. as long as
(1 ¡ E°)=E° > a1=10: (A3)
Further, the driver is indi®erent between any speed above the limit by 10 miles as well as not
speeding at all as long as
(1 ¡ E°)=E° = a1=10; (A4)
Thus, the driver will randomize over any speed exceeding the limit by ten miles as well as
37speeding at or below the limit. In addition, the marginal bene¯t of speeding staying constant at
each speed is surely far from describing a plausible and realistic situation.
A.2 Personal variations on the driver bene¯t function
Assume that there are n > 1 di®erent segments of motorists with di®erent levels of bene¯ts at
speeds exceeding the speed limit. Using the following driver variable bene¯t function will allow
such personal variations regarding the drivers' taste for speeding, where µi; ¸i > 0 with: vi(s;c) =
a0 + µi~ s(c;r)s ¡ ¸is2 such that µn > µn¡1 > ::: > µ1 > 0 and 0 < ¸n < ¸n¡1 < ::: < ¸1, i= 1, 2,
..., n. Given any utility function, if the driver chooses to speed, the optimizing behavior yields








. Thus, µn=¸n · 2
is implied so that the \maximum speed s¤ chosen by a driver when ° = 0" cannot possibly exceed
~ s(c;r). Note that a very low µ1 and a very high ¸1 may allow the presence of a segment of drivers
who would not speed even when ° is very low (especially if a0 is also su±ciently low or zero).
A.3 Personal variations on o±cers' types
Again, here too, to allow personal variations one can assume that there are m > 1 di®erent segments
of o±cers by re-scaling tR
r via a parameter ¿i > 0, where i = 1; 2; :::; m. This will allow us - among
other possibilities - to consider real-life cases where di®erent segments of o±cers using prominent
speed-cuto® probabilities such as 10 or 15 miles above the limit before they would consider issuing
a ticket, and so on.
A.4 The stopping decision
The stopping decision (which is unobservable to the econometrician) is typically made in the absence
of any information about c as well as about r. There is the time cost of stopping a driver, , separate
from the ticketing cost t. Let the set below, (c¤;r¤js), denote the set of driver types whose ticketing










¡ t ¸ 0
¾
:
That is, a police o±cer, upon stopping a driver, will ticket her if and only if his ticketing net bene¯t
is non-negative. Note that (c;r) cannot be observed by the o±cer before he makes the stop. Let
F(cjw;s) and F(cja;s) be the distribution of c in the white and African-American populations,
38respectively, conditional on observed speed s. Let G(rjs) be the probability that the driver who is
stopped turns out to be of race rconditional on s. Let B(c¤;r¤jC;R;s), denote the expected net
bene¯t of an o±cer of type (C;R) from ticketing a driver of type (c¤;r¤js) - who is stopped at















such that (c;r) 2 (c¤;r¤js): Once the o±cer observes a vehicle speeding at speed (s), he compares
his stopping cost T to it to choose the probability ¯ of stopping that motorist.
B(c¤;r¤jC;R;s) ¡ T: (A5)
Equation (A5) implies the following. If the term in (A5) is positive, the optimizing behavior
implies ¯(C;R;s) = 1. If that term is negative, then the optimizing behavior implies ¯(C;R;s) = 0.
If that term is zero, then the o±cer will be willing to randomize over whether or not to stop a
motorist traveling at speed s.
T may be expected to be fully idiosyncratic. However, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that
many o±cers set their radar guns to beep at certain focal speed levels such as 10 m.p.h. above
the speed limit. The generic explanation by Albers and Albers (1983) seems to be relevant here as
well.
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